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Controlled ‘Europeanisation’? The KMW–Nexter merger 
and the Germany’s new strategy for the arms industry
Justyna Gotkowska
On 29 July a deal was signed in Paris concerning a merger between Krauss-Maffei Wegmann 
(KMW), Germany’s largest manufacturer of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery sys-
tems, and its French counterpart Nexter. The new holding formed as a result of the merger will 
be Europe’s largest producer of arms systems for land forces, comparable to the Airbus Group 
in the aerospace industry. While work  on finalising the merger was underway, the German gov- 
ernment was developing a new strategy for Germany’s arms industry, which was published on 
9 June 2015. The strategy’s provisions show that German politicians, despite holding negative 
opinions on previous mergers between German arms companies and foreign businesses, have 
concluded that consolidation at the European level is nonetheless the only way to go. Howe-
ver, the strategy also states that the German government should exercise more influence than 
previously on the terms and conditions of any such consolidation. To this end, it identified key 
national technologies which will be supported and protected through various instruments, in- 
cluding also the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements on strategic defence co-operation. 
Such agreements may regulate questions such as the ownership structures of the new compa-
nies, the locations for developing technologies and for manufacturing products, subcontractors 
and exports of jointly developed arms and military equipment. In relation to the KMW–Nexter 
merger, such a deal between France and Germany is expected to be signed this autumn.
The lie of the land
Germany has a strong, state-of-the-art arms 
sector: according to SIPRI figures, in the years 
2010–2014 the country ranked as the third-larg-
est exporter of arms and military equipment 
globally, along with France and China (and after 
the United States and Russia), which each have 
a five-percent market share)1. 
Most defence contractors in Germany are private 
companies that are exclusively German-owned. 
They hold well-established positions as manufac-
1 Siemon T. Wezeman, Pieter D. Wezeman, ‘Trends in inter-
national arms transfers’, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2014, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/
measuring/recent-trends-in-arms-transfers 
turers and exporters of systems for land forces 
and navies. Duopolies of large companies oper-
ate in these two sectors. Krauss-Maffei Weg- 
mann (KMW) and Rheinmetall Defence man-
ufacture tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, ar-
moured personnel carriers and artillery for land 
troops, while ThyssenKrupp Industrial Solutions 
(TKIS with the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems/
TKMS industry cluster) and Lürssen Defence 
manufacture boats and warships for the navy. 
Germany’s medium-sized arms companies in-
clude Heckler&Koch (small arms), Diehl Defence 
(guided missiles and air defence systems), MTU 
Aero Engines and MTU Friedrichshafen (engines 
and propulsion systems), and there are also 
many small- and medium-sized subcontract-
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ing companies that occupy leading positions 
in their respective niche military technology 
fields, manufacturing subassemblies for the 
aerospace and shipbuilding sectors as well as 
land systems (OHB, Rhode-Schwarz, Plath, ESG, 
Atlas Elektronik). 
So far, ’European’ mergers have taken place 
in Germany’s aerospace industry and, partly, 
in the missile systems sector. Opinions in Ger-
many of the European consolidation projects 
undertaken so far are negative. The wave of 
consolidations in the Western European arms 
industry in the beginning of the XXI century 
led to the creation of the EADS concern (2000), 
which manufactures aircraft and helicopters 
for the civilian and military markets (formed as 
a result of a merger of companies from France, 
Germany and Spain; the company was renamed 
Airbus Group in 2014) and the establishment 
of the MBDA group (through a merger of com-
panies from France, the UK, Italy and Spain in 
2001, joined by German LFK in 2005). Both con-
cerns are present in Germany through the man-
ufacturing plants of the Airbus Group divisions 
(Airbus, Airbus Defence & Space, Airbus Helicop-
ters)2 and an MBDA subsidiary (MBDA Deutsch-
land) which manufactures gudied missiles and 
air defence systems. However, opinions of these 
mergers, especially in the case of Airbus Group, 
are negative, as German politicians openly ad-
mit3. One problem concerns the fact that major 
Bundeswehr’s procurement projects implement-
ed by EADS/Airbus Group (the A400M transport 
aircraft, the NH90 and Tiger helicopters) have 
been delayed by several years as a result of diffi-
2 Airbus (manufacture of civilian aircraft: Hamburg, Bre-
men), Airbus Defence & Space (military production: 
Ottobrunn, satellite subassemblies; Friedrichshafen, 
probes and satellites; Manching, the Eurofighter; Ulm, 
radars; Bremen, the A400M), Airbus Helicopters (manu-
facture of helicopters: Donauwörth,the H135 and H145, 
the Tiger and the NH90). 
3 Rainer Arnold (spokesman on the defence policy of the 
the SPD Parliamentary Group), ‘Ausverkauf deutscher 
Panzer an Frankreich verhindern!’, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, 8 July 2015, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/
politik/inland/ruestungsindustrie-keine-deutschen-pan-
zer-an-frankreich-13690282.html 
culties in managing the ‘European’ company and 
in the decentralisation of production (in addition 
to the diversified and changing national speci-
fications). Moreover, both the company’s head-
quarters and its technology competence centres 
have been moved from Germany to France in 
recent years. The German government, which 
holds 12% of shares in the company (as does 
France) refused to authorise its further ‘Europe-
anisation’ in 2012, i.e. the planned merger with 
the UK’s BAE Systems4. It feared that the merger 
would have brought a further marginalisation of 
the German production plants within EADS/Air-
bus Group and a weakening of the market posi-
tion of other German defence companies (KMW 
and Rheinmetall Defence) due to possible bet-
ter access of BAE Systems products to European 
markets. The German government could prevent 
the merger because of its stake in EADS/Airbus 
Group, but Germany also has other instruments 
to control the ownership structures of the coun-
try’s private arms-producing companies. In par-
ticular, these include the requirement, provided 
for in the law on foreign businesses, to obtain 
the consent of the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy before any takeover of some 
or all shares in a German defence company by 
a foreign business5. It was probably on this basis 
that the German government blocked the sale of 
the ‘military’ assets of the ThyssenKrupp Marine 
Systems (TKMS) to the UAE’s Abu Dhabi MAR 
fund in 2011, only allowing the fund to acquire 
the company’s ‘civilian’ and foreign assets.
4 Airbus Group is the only arms company in which the 
German government holds stakes through KfW, the Ger-
man government-owned banking group.
5 See Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG), Par. 5, Abs. (3), 
http: //www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht /
awg_2013/gesamt.pdf 
Hitherto the ‘Europisation’ of the arms in-
dustry in Germany mainly took place in the 
air and space sectors.
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The agreement on the merger of Germany’s 
KMW and France’s Nexter, signed on 29 July, 
which established Newco, a holding in which 
each side holds 50% of shares, means that Ger-
many has now overcome its aversion to the 
consolidation of German defence businesses at 
the European level. The Newco holding will be 
Europe’s largest manufacturer of systems for 
land forces, comparable to the Airbus Group 
in the aerospace industry. KWM and Nexter 
specialise in the production of systems for 
land troops (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, 
armoured personnel carriers, artillery); their 
ranges partly overlap and are partly comple-
mentary. The merger has been approved by 
the German government. Already in May this 
year the German Secretary of State for Defence 
announced that France and Germany plan to 
conduct joint capability studies for a new-gen-
eration main battle tank that would succeed 
the Leopard 2 in use by the Bundeswehr. The 
joint project will be most likely conducted by 
the new holding. Moreover, the KMW-Nexter 
agreement was signed in Paris, in the presence 
of the French Defence Minister and the German 
Defence State Secretary. The merger spells the 
end of Germany’s specialisation in an import-
ant branch of the arms industry, i.e. the manu-
facture of systems for land forces, with such re-
nowned products as the Leopard tanks and the 
PzH 2000 armoured howitzers. In the longer 
term it may also have an adverse effect on the 
position of Rheinmetall Defence, KMW’s long-
time partner. The pending joint projects will be 
continued (Leopard 2, Puma, Boxer, PzH 2000), 
but the two companies are unlikely to be able to 
continue jointly developing new products (Nex-
ter will replace Rheinmetall Defence as KMW’s 
main partner). As a result, Rheinmetall Defence 
will lose an important co-operation partner, 
and may be forced to seek a merger with a for-
eign partner or with a German business (one of 
those that are currently up for sale) and expand 
its range of products. Some of German assets 
of Airbus Defence & Space have been offered 
for sale (the manufacturing plants in Ulm, Frie-
drichshafen and Unterschleißheim, as well as 
shares in the Atlas Elektronik company)6. Airbus 
Defence & Space announced in autumn 2014 
that it intended to focus on the manufacture 
of military aircraft, missiles, satellites and their 
launch vehicles. It was reported at that same 
time that ThyssenKrupp could sell its shipyards 
building submarines and vessels, which are part 
of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS, ship-
yards in Kiel, Hamburg and Emden)7.
Industry and politics 
German arms companies, which used to sell their 
products mainly to the German armed forces and 
other EU and NATO states before the economic 
crisis in Europe, have recently been struggling 
under the new conditions on the European mar-
ket. The crisis has brought about stagnation and 
reduced defence budgets in Europe, with less 
spending on new arms and military equipment 
in NATO and the EU, which until recently were 
the main buyers of German exports. Germany’s 
internal market also shrank as the Bundeswehr 
reduced the volume of its contracts in the wake 
of the reforms started in 2011 with a view to re-
ducing the size of the armed forces and strength-
ening their expeditionary character, combined 
with the new policy on the management and 
procurement of arms and military equipment. 
6 ‘Airbus-Umbau betrifft Tausende Jobs’, ARD, 26.02.2015, 
https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/airbus-155.html 
7 ‘Rheinmetall will Marinesparte von Thyssen-Krupp 
kaufen’, Handelsblatt, 12 September 2014, http://www.
handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/ruestung-
skonzern-ruestet-auf-rheinmetall-will-marinespar-
te-von-thyssen-krupp-kaufen/10691754.html 
The merger of KWM and Nexter will lead 
to the creation of the largest producer of 
systems for land forces in Europe, compa-
rable with the Airbus Group.
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German companies tried to cope with the situa-
tion by actively looking for new markets in third 
countries, i.e. beyond NATO and the EU – with 
the approval of the German government, mean-
ing especially the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in the 
years 2009–2013. The Christian Democrats and 
the Liberals were quite generous in issuing ex-
port licences, despite the restrictive formal politi-
cal guidelines according to which German-made 
arms and military equipment may only be ex-
ported to third countries in exceptional cases 
justified by the special security policy interests of 
Germany. The volume of government-authorised 
exports of German arms and military equipment 
increased systematically,8 and the proportions 
between arms exports to NATO and the EU and 
exports to third countries became reversed: 
from 60% (to NATO and UE countries) and 40% 
(to third countries) before the crisis, to 40% and 
60% respectively in 2013.  
When the new CDU/CSU-SPD coalition came 
to power in the aftermath of the Bundestag 
elections in the autumn of 2013, the change 
of government had an impact on the the Ger-
man defence sector. The new leaders of the 
two ministries of key importance for the sec-
tor (economy and defence) were high-rank-
ing politicians from parties that cooperate but 
also compete with one another within the co-
alition (the SPD and the CDU). This resulted in 
a change of the government’s policy toward 
the arms industry that negatively affected the 
arms manufacturers. On the one hand, Sigmar 
Gabriel, the SPD leader in charge of the Minis-
try for Economic Affairs, which plays a key role 
in issuing the licences for the export of arms 
and military equipment, has started to advo-
cate a more restrictive policy of arms exports 
8 The value of (individual) licences issued was (in billions of 
euros): 4.2 (2005), 4.1 (2006), 3.6 (2007), 5.7 (2008), 5.0 
(2009), 4.7 (2010), 5.4 (2011), 4.7 (2012), 5.8 (2013). See 
Justyna Gotkowska, ‘New market conditions and “exit 
strategies“ for the German arms industry’, OSW Com-
mentary, March 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-12/new-market-condi-
tions-and-exit-strategies-german-arms-industry 
to third countries, especially to regions experi-
encing or threatened by crises and conflicts (the 
Gulf countries, North Africa). Minister Gabriel’s 
stance is largely determined by internal political 
considerations. The production and exports of 
arms has been criticised by the left-wing elites 
and public opinion. The SPD fears that the issue 
can be exploited by the post-communist Die 
Linke party, eroding the social democrats’ elec-
torate should they continue with their predeces-
sors’ export policy. As a result, the volume of 
exports of arms and military equipment autho-
rised by the ministry fell in 2014 to €3.9 billion, 
compared to €5.8 billion in 2013 and €4.7 bil-
lion in 20129. On the other hand the aim of Ur-
sula von der Leyen, the Defence Minister and 
a candidate to succeed Angela Merkel as the 
CDU leader, is to prove to her party and German 
public opinion that she is capable of dealing with 
the defence sector’s ‘Augean stables’. Problems 
with the procurement projects at the German 
MoD had seriously tainted the reputation of her 
predecessor, Thomas de Maizière. After a series 
of scandals10 Minister von der Leyen has been 
seeking to introduce new rules for co-operation 
with German defence companies, with a view to 
9 According to figures from the Ministry for Economic Af-
fairs, in the first half of 2015 the value of licences was 
higher than in the comparable periods in previous years. 
However, a larger proportion of the licences issued in 
the first half of 2015 concerned arms and military equip-
ment exports to EU and NATO countries; a full picture 
will only emerge from the figures to be published in ear-
ly 2016. See Reply of the Ministry for EconomicAffairs 
and Energy to questions No 134 and 135, 3 August 2015, 
http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-37306.pdf 
10 Justyna Gotkowska, ‘Defence procurement – a minefield 
for Germany’s new defence minister’, OSW Analysis, 
26 February 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikac-
je/analyses/2014-02-26/defence-procurement-a-mine-
field-germanys-new-defence-minister  
Since the start of his term, the German 
economics minister Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) 
has favoured a more restrictive policy of 
exports to third countries.
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making the Bundeswehr’s procurement projects 
more market-oriented. The toughened policy of 
the two ministries affects those German defence 
companies which produce mainly for the mili-
tary market, i.e. the manufacturers of systems 
for land forces and their German subcontractors, 
and to a lesser extent, the producers of warships 
for the navy. The aerospace companies such as 
Airbus Group combine their military operations 
with larger civilian business activity, while com-
panies such as KMW have been forced to seek 
new solutions to keep and develop their busi-
ness11. In the wake of the merger, KMW expects 
to gain access to new markets and to be able to 
export the Franco-German holding’s products to 
third countries more easily, since exports of arms 
and military equipment by a ‘European’ compa-
ny will be less controversial internally in Germa-
ny and will be possibly subject to different rules 
agreed with the French government (probably 
based in part on the 1972 Schmidt-Debré deal)12. 
In 2014, under pressure from the German com-
panies, and in view of the fact that talks on the 
merger of KMW and Nexter were advancing, 
the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition started working on 
a new strategy for the government’s policy to-
wards the arms industry. The tone of the de-
bate, widely publicised by the German media, 
was set by the ministers of the economy and 
11 Ursula Schwarzer, ‘Umsatz des Panzer-Herstellers 
Krauss-Maffei Wegmann bricht um fast die Halfte ein’, 
19 June 2014, Manager magazin, http://www.manag-
er-magazin.de/finanzen/artikel/a-976180.html 
12 The Schmidt-Debré agreement concluded in 1972 con-
cerns bilateral intergovernmental defence co-operation 
between Germany and France. Under the agreement, the 
governments may not hinder exports to third countries 
of jointly produced arms and military equipment. An ex-
port licence may only be refused in exceptional cases. The 
Schmidt-Debré deal has been applied to such joint proj-
ects as MILAN, HOT, ROLAND, RATAC, C 160 Transall. 
defence, who presented different visions of the 
sector’s future development and tried to make 
the other ministry responsible for supporting it. 
The Ministry of Defence presented its vision in 
the autumn of 2014 in a non-paper on support-
ing key technologies in the arms industry13. The 
document stated that purchases of arms and 
military equipment should be guided primarily 
by the needs of the Bundeswehr, and not by 
what the German defence companies have on 
offer. It also stated that because of the limit-
ed resources and instruments at hand, the list 
of key national technologies supported by the 
government in this sector should be limited. 
Moreover, from the Ministry’s point of view, 
the question of market access, which can be 
gained through mergers, was more important 
in the context of the need to keep technologies 
and know-how in Germany than disputes over 
‘national’, ‘European’ or ‘international’ consol-
idation. Co-operation and consolidation at the 
European and international levels should be re-
garded as complementary actions for the pres-
ervation of national technologies in Germany. 
According to the MoD, it was also necessary 
for the government (including the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs) to support the export of arms 
and military equipment as a way to keep the 
key technologies in Germany. 
Sigmar Gabriel, the minister for economy, pre-
sented quite different proposals concerning the 
shape of the German arms industry and gov-
ernment support in October 201414. He stuck 
to his restrictive stance on arms and military 
equipment exports to third countries, called for 
a broader definition of key national competences 
in the defence industry, and suggested that the 
Ministry of Defence should define in advance its 
13 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Zusammenfass- 
ende Überlegungen des BMVg zur Festlegung von Schlüs-
seltechnologien, autumn 2014, https://www.tagesschau.
de/inland/diskussionpapier-bmvg-101.pdf 
14 Sigmar Gabriel, ‘Rede von Bundesminister Gabriel zu 
den Grundsätzen deutscher Rüstungsexportpolitik’, 
8 September 2014, http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Presse/re-
den,did=661856.html 
The defence minister Ursula von der Leyen 
(CDU) favours the increased marketisation 
of procurement for the Bundeswehr.
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procurement plans and declare what projects in-
volving German companies it intends to support 
in the long term (i.e. after the completion of the 
current ones). The minister also called for a con-
solidation of arms-producing companies within 
Germany as a solution that should take prece-
dence before mergers with foreign companies. 
SPD deputies have backed this position while vo-
cally criticising the KMW-Nexter merger15.
The government’s strategy: ‘Europeani-
sation’ with key national technologies
In early June 2015 the consultations between 
the two ministries, which also involved the Fed-
eral Foreign Office and the Chancellery, resulted 
in the formulation of the German government’s 
comprehensive strategy for the arms industry, 
the first such document in several years16. 
The strategy underlines the issue of the ‘Eu-
ropeanisation’ of Germany’s arms industry. 
(1) The German government advocates sup-
port measures for the arms sector to be taken 
on the EU level (e.g. support for research and 
innovation, standardisation and certification, 
the introduction of European standards for 
the licencing of arms and military equipment 
exports, and the development of the Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy). (2) It also 
calls for more European co-operation and in-
tegration in terms of the development of mil-
itary capabilities, which should go hand in 
15 Rainer Arnold, ‘Ausverkauf deutscher Panzer an Frankreich 
verhindern!’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 July 2015, 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/ruestungsindus-
trie-keine-deutschen-panzer-an-frankreich-13690282.html
16 Bundesregierung, Strategiepapier der Bundesregierung 
zur Stärkung der Verteidigungsindustrie in Deutschland, 
9 June 2015, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PD-
F/S-T/strategiepapier-bundesregierung-staerkung-vertei-
digungsindustrie-deutschland,property=pdf,bereich=b-
mwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf. The last government 
document concerning the sector was the list of key na-
tional technological and production competencies agreed 
between the Ministry of Defence and the Federation of 
German industries (BDI) in 2007. See ‘Bundesverteidigung-
sministerium and BDI, Gemeinsame Erklärung zu Natio-
nalen Wehrtechnischen Kernfähigkeiten, 20 November 
2007, http://www.bdsv.eu/de/Taetigkeitsfelder/Themen/
Technologien.htm
hand with co-operation in the arms industry. 
In line with the Framework Nation Concept 
which Berlin has been promoting within NATO 
in recent years, Germany wishes to undertake 
strategic military co-operation with certain 
states, buttressed by industrial co-operation17. 
The document mentions better co-ordination 
of defence planning, the implementation of 
joint research and development projects, and 
joint procurement. Those measures should be 
based on unified specifications for arms and 
military equipment and an adequate division 
of industrial tasks between the co-operating 
countries. (3) The government has also pledged 
more support for European co-operation and 
mergers in the arms industry, on the condi-
tion that national interests are safeguarded. 
Defining the key national technologies is meant 
to be the instrument that will safeguard Ger-
man national interests, i.e. keep certain techno-
logical and production capabilities in Germany 
while the German arms industry ‘Europeanises’. 
It is meant to ensure the security of supplies 
for the Bundeswehr in certain areas, but also 
to preserve Germany’s position as NATO’s im-
portant member state in terms of military-tech-
nological capabilities and to secure Germany’s 
place in the European and global technology 
and production chains. The government has 
identified key technologies in the following 
fields: command (mainly encription), reconnais-
sance (mainly sensor technology), impact/ef-
fect (mainly armoured vehicles and underwater 
17 Justyna Gotkowska, ‘Germany’s idea of a European 
army’, OSW Analysis, 25 March 2015, http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-03-25/germa-
nys-idea-a-european-army 
In its first complex strategy for its arms 
industry in years, Germany has fore-
grounded the question of ‘Europeanising’ 
this sector.
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units), and support (mainly protection). Main-
taining these technologies in Germany need 
not be contradictory to the ‘Europeanisation’ 
of the German industry; this may be assured 
through bilateral or multilateral agreements 
with the partners. 
In the strategy, the government also listed the 
instruments it will use to support the German 
arms industry, with special focus on key technol-
ogies. (1) These include arrangements and joint 
priority setting between ministries with regard 
to the allocation of research and development 
funding for defence companies (including for 
the development of dual-use products). (2) The 
government has also pledged to support the 
arms exports to NATO and EU countries, and 
also to third countries (if congruent with the 
political guidelines discussed above) through 
instruments of Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and the Ministry of Defence (e.g. training in use 
of arms and military equipment provided by the 
Bundeswehr). The government also intends to 
conclude inter-ministerial or intergovernmental 
agreements to boost the chances of German 
companies in large foreign procurement pro-
grammes. (3) The maintenance and develop-
ment of key technologies are to be supported 
through preferences in the purchases of arms 
and military equipment by the German MoD 
and through an appropriate industrial policy. 
Finally, the government has called for a broader 
public debate on the role of the arms industry 
and its exports for the German economy and 
the German and European security policy, in or-
der to make public discourse on the issue more 
factual and less one-sided. 
Germany’s strategy for its arms industry is 
founded on the belief that there is no alterna-
tive to European consolidation of that industry, 
but the terms and conditions of consolidation 
should be shaped, to a much greater extent 
than they have been hitherto, by the German 
government. The KMW-Nexter merger is an ex-
ample of an increasingly clear trend for private 
German defence companies to merge with for-
eign partners. However, because of the nega-
tive experiences with such mergers in previous 
years, the German government wishes to have 
more control of the process, so that consolida-
tion with (for instance) French companies does 
not take place at the expense of German tech-
nology clusters, production plants or subcon-
tractors. To this end, key national technologies 
were identified, which will be supported and 
protected, also through the conclusion of inter-
governmental agreements on strategic defence 
co-operation issues18. Those deals may regulate 
such issues as the ownership structure of joint 
companies, the locations for the development 
of technologies and production, subcontrac-
tors and exports of the jointly developed arms 
and military equipment19. In relation to the 
KMW-Nexter merger, such an agreement be-
tween Germany and France is expected to be 
concluded in the autumn of 2015. 
18 Minor parliamentary question concerning the merger 
of Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Nexter, BT-Drucksache 
18/5511, 30 July 2015, www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/
PDF/P-R/Parlamentarische-Anfragen/2015/18-5511,proper-
ty=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
19 Martin Greive, Thorsten Jungholt, Gesche Wüpper, ‘Wie 
Deutschland die Rüstungskompetenz verscherbelt’, Die 
Welt, 2 August 2015, http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/ar-
ticle144714023/Wie-Deutschland-die-Ruestungskompe-
tenz-verscherbelt.html 
Defining the key technologies is intended 
as an instrument for guaranteeing nation-
al interests in the German arms industry 
as it ‘Europeanises’ itself.
8OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 180
APPENDIX
List of Germany’s largest arms manufacturers
Name Main products Plants in Germany Number of employ-
ees in Germany
Revenue
Airbus Defence 
& Space 
Airbus Group 
division
satellite subassemblies, probes 
and satellites, Eurofighter aircraft, 
unmanned aircraft, radar technol-
ogies, A400M military transport 
aircraft; servicing of Bundeswehr 
aircraft
Ottobrunn/Bavaria,
Friedrichshafen/
Baden-Württemberg, 
Manching/Bavaria,
Ulm/Baden-Württem-
berg, Bremen
around 20,000 in 
Germany (of a total 
of 45,000)
€12.7 billion 
(2014) for the 
entire compa-
ny, not just in 
Germany
Rheinmetall 
Defence 
part of the  
Rheinmetall AG 
concern; differ-
ent subsidiaries 
(also foreign) 
operate within 
three divisions
Combat Systems division: wheeled 
armoured personnel carriers 
(Fuchs, Boxer; co-operation with 
KMW), infantry fighting vehicles 
(Marder, Puma; in co-operation 
with KMW), tanks (Leopard 2; 
co-operation with KMW), self- 
propelled howitzers (PzH 2000; 
co-operation with  
z KMW), turrets, cannons and 
ammunition;
Electronic Solutions Division:
air defence system (Mantis), 
‘soldier of the future’ system, 
command and reconnaissance 
systems, sensors, simulators and 
trainers;
Wheeled Vehicles Division: 
military trucks
Headquarters in 
Düsseldorf, manufac-
turing plants in various 
locations including 
Lower Saxony, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, 
Baden-Württemberg, 
Bavaria, Schleswig 
-Holstein
around 8000-9000 
in Germany  
(of a total of 
10,000)
around €2.2 
billion (2014)
(the revenue 
of the entire 
Rheinmetall AG 
concern is €4.6 
billion euro)
Airbus Helicop-
ters 
Airbus Group 
division
Helicopters: H135, H145, Tiger, 
marine version of NH90; helicop-
ter servicing
Donauwörth/Bavaria,
Kassel/Hesse
around 7000 in 
Germany (of a total 
of 20,000)
€5.9 billion 
(2014) for the 
entire compa-
ny, not just in 
Germany
ThyssenKrupp 
Marine Sys-
tems (TKMS) 
– business area 
within Thyssen-
Krupp Industrial 
Solutions (TKIS) 
at the Thyssen 
Krupp concern 
submarines (class 209, 210, 212A, 
214, 216);
naval surface vessels: frigates 
(124 and 125, MEKO A-200, MEKO 
600, MEKO CSL; corvettes (MEKO 
80, 90, A-100, 130), patrol boats 
(MEKO OPV), Berlin-class combat 
support ship)
Kiel/Schleswig 
-Holstein,
Hamburg, Emden/Low-
er Saxony
around 3200   
in Germany (of  
a total of 18,000 
TKIS employees and 
157,000 employees 
of the ThyssenKrupp 
concern)
around 
€1.7 billion 
(2013/2014) 
(the revenue 
of TKIS is €6.2 
billion euro)
Diehl Defence 
part of the Diehl 
concern which 
includes: 
Diehl BGT De-
fence and sub-
sidiaries (AIM, 
JUNGHANS 
Defence) and the 
joint ventures 
(Diehl Raytheon 
Missile Systeme, 
Diehl&Eagle 
Picher, Euro 
Spike, PARSYS, 
RAM-Systeme)
guided missiles: Sidewinder family 
(in co-operation with Raytheon), 
IRIS-T family of missiles, LFK NG 
missiles (in co-operation with 
MBDA Deutschland), IDAS missiles 
(in co-operation with TKMS), 
RBS15 Mk3 missiles (in co-oper-
ation with Saab Dynamics),  the 
RAM system (in co-operation with 
MBDA Deutschland and Raythe-
on), PARS 3 LR missiles (co-oper-
ation with MBDA Deutschland), 
Spike LR missiles (in co-operation 
with z Rheinmetall and Rafael)
Air defence system: IRIS-T SLM
Ammunition: hand grenades, 
ammunition for artillery and boat 
cannons 
SIMONE surveillance and recon-
naissance systems for warships 
and civilian vessels
Überlingen/
Baden-Württemberg, 
Nonnweiler/Saarland, 
Röthenbach/Bavaria, 
Troisdorf/North 
Rhine-Westphalia
Schrobenhausen/
Bavaria, Ottobrunn/
Bavaria,
Dunningen/
Baden-Württemberg
around 2800 in 
Germany
around €500 
million (2014)
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Name Main products Plants in Germany Number of employ-
ees in Germany
Revenue
Kraus-Maffei 
Wegmann (KMW)
combat systems: Leopard 1 
and 2 main battle tanks (in 
co-operation with Rheinmetall 
Defence), Puma infantry fight-
ing vehicles (in co-operation 
with Rheinmetall Defence), air 
defence systems (Fennek armed 
with Stinger missiles), artillery 
(AGM, DONAR, MARS II, PzH 
2000 – in co-operation with 
Rheinmetall Defence), command 
systems
support systems: Dingo 2, Fen-
nek, Mungo multitask armoured 
vehicles (reconnaissance, 
command post, NBC recon-
naissance, transport), engineer 
equipment (combat bridges, 
ferries)
armament systems: mechanical 
gun mounts, remote controlled 
weapon stations
training and simulations: civilian 
and military, battlefield simu-
lators
Munich/Bavaria, 
Kassel/Hesse, Ham-
burg, Konstanz/
Baden Württem-
berg, Kölleda/
Thuringen, Meinz/
Rheinland-Palati-
nate, Inglostadt/
Bavaria, Freisen/
Saarland
around 2600 in Ger-
many (of a total of 
around 3200 KMW 
employees)
around €1 billion 
(2014)
Lürssen Defence 
one of the two  
Fr. Lürssen Werft 
business areas
fast patrol boats, offshore 
patrol vessels, corvettes and 
frigates (in co-operation with 
TKMS), minesweepers & mine-
hunters, fleet support vessels
Bremen, Hamburg,
Lemwerder/Lower 
Saxony, Wilhelm-
shaven/Lower 
Saxony, Berne/Low-
er Saxony, Wolgast/
Mecklemburg-Vor-
pommern, Rends-
burg/Schleswig-Hol-
stein
around 1600 
in Germany
around €400 
million (2013) 
(the revenue of 
Fr. Lürssen Werft 
is €829 million)
MBDA Deutschland 
daughter company 
of MBDA  
co-operation in the manufac-
ture of air defence systems: 
PATRIOT, MEADS, LFK NG; 
manufacture of guided missiles: 
Taurus KEPD 350, PARS 3 LR, 
RIM ESSM, MILAN
Schrobenhausen/
Bavaria, Aschau am 
Inn/Bavaria, Ulm/
Baden-Württem-
berg
around 1300  
in Germany
around €400 
million
Heckler & Koch pistols, submachine guns, 
assault rifles, machine guns, 
precision rifles, 40-mm systems
Oberndorf/
Baden-Württem-
berg  
around 730  
in Germany
around €220 
million (2013)
Author’s own research
